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SUMMARY
The recent Brazilian industrial and technology policy
seems to be anchored in the idea that, as part of the so-
called globalisation process, technology has also become
‘global’ and that, like a commodity, technology could be
acquired internationally under market conditions. Under such
view, policies geared to attract foreign investment and
pressures on local firms to achieve better quality and improve
productivity that would suffice in order for the Brazilian
industry to increase competitiveness. Recent research,
however, has extensively clarified the ‘globalisation of
technology’ thesis.
A detailed analysis of the thesis shows, however, that
‘global exploitation of technology’ is the only strong case for
‘techno-globalism’. Technologies are increasingly been
exploited in foreign markets both embodied in products and
disembodied, for example via transfer of licences and know-
how. The willingness of firms to exploit their innovations in
foreign market does not necessarily mean that they will be
successful. As for disembodied technologies this depends on
policies by national governments and firms which can
facilitate and foster the import of technology.
Analysing the Brazilian case, the papaer argues that the
main problem is not about the ‘quantity’ of technology
acquired from abroad; it is about how that technology igs
acquired. If increased volumes of imported technology are tq
play their full potential role in enhancing competitiveness in
the 1990s, it will be totally inadequate just to go back to the
typical ways of acquiring technology in the past. Those
approaches must be radically altered. Some of the new
understanding about the process of technological change, its
role in the competitiveness of industry, and its interaction
with technology imports, that has become more widely
accessible since the 1970s, suggests that these aspects of
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Brazilian experience were neither inevitable nor similar to the
experience of a few otherindustrialising economies that have
exploited imported technology much more effectively. Also,
the 1990s are not the 1970s and the international context
for technology acquisition by Brazilian firms is now radically
different. New approachesto managementand policy will be
neededif Brazilian industry is to exploit the full contribution
to competitiveness that can be made by imported
technology.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The recent Brazilian industrial and technology Policyseems to be anchored in the idea that, as part of the so-called globalisation process, technology has also become‘global’ and that like a commodity, technology could beacquired internationally under market conditions. In suchview, policies geared to attract foreign investment andpressures onlocal firms to achieve better quality and improveproductivity would suffice in order for the Brazilian industryto increase competitiveness. Recent research, however, hasextensively clarified the ‘globalisation of technology’ thesis,
Techno-globalism is a term that is being widely used
for the hypothesis that generation, transmission and diffusion
of technologies are becoming increasingly global in scope.
Implicitly, techno-globalists assume that technologies are
commodities and propose that, in a borderless world,
international technologies are accessible by firms and could
be transferred internationally under a market Mediation via
the price mechanism.
The extensive literature on the economics of technicalchange, innovation and diffusion of technologies Published in
the last 20 years’ may help to clarify and qualify techno-
globalism. Archibugi and Michie (1995), for instance,
proposed three distinct categories under which technological
globalisation should be analysed. Thefirst Category, ‘global
technological collaboration’, refers to the idea that there isinternational collaboration betweenfirms, sharing know-howwith competitors from different countries. The secondcategory, ‘global generation of technology’, is that big firms
multinational corporations are increasing the internationalintegration of their R&D and technological activities. The
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third should be the ‘global exploitation of technology’,
meaning that an increasing proportion of technological
innovations are exploited in international markets.
Empirical evidence for the first category - global
technological collaboration - shows that there has been a
significant increase in cross-border collaboration by both non-
profit institutions (such as universities) and the business
Sector (Frame and Narin, 1988; Hagedoorn and Schakenraad,
1992; Lastres, 1993), However, joint R&D by the business
Sector is confined to a very few, although crucial, fields:
information technology, biotechnology and advanced
Materials. Also, and most important, joint R&D by firms is a
Phenomenom that tends to occur either inside the ‘home
country’ of firms (approximately 50 per cent of recorded
technological agreements are made by firms exclusively of
US, Japan and Western Europe ) or between firms of the
Triad (Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1992; Lastres 1993).
As for the second category - global generation of
technology - empirical evidence (Patel 1995) based on
patenting activities shows that US and Japanese firms are
still very ‘national’ in their strategies of technology
generation: only 3,1% and 1,2%, respectively, of their R&D
results originated outside their borders. European firms,
however, are more prone to use foreign R&D, although a
substantial part of this is done in other European countries.
In short, global generation of technology is largely an intra-
European phenomenom.
Finally, the third category refers to the exploitation oftechnology byfirms in international markets. This is certainlynot a new phenomenom, but has increasedits importancein recent times. The point to be madehereis thatif a largershare of firms’ output directed to foreign markets the globalexploitation of technology is the conseque
Cause of the increase in international trad ibugiMichie 1995). €@ (Archibugi and
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Summing up, the case for ‘global generation of
technology’ is very weak, ‘global technological collaboration
of technology’ refers to few ‘hi-tech areas’ and is
concentrated on ‘Triad countries’ and ‘global exploitation of
technology’ is the only strong case for ‘techno-globalism’,
Technologies are increasingly been exploited in foreign
markets both embodied in products and disembodied, for
example, via transfer of licences and know-how. However,
as emphasised by Archibugi and Michie (1995), the
willingness of firms to exploit their innovations in foreign
market does not necessarily mean that they will be
successful. As for disembodied technologies, this depends
on policies by national governments and firms which can
facilitate and foster the import of technology.
Since the mid-1970s Brazilian recorded payments for
technology (royalties, technical assistance fees and
commissions) have fallen steadily to very low levels, both in
absolute terms and as a proportion of GDP (Bell and
Cassiolato 1993). When associated with the stagnantlevels
of domestic R&D, this trend, closely linked to low levels of
industrial investment since the early 1980s, also seems to
reflect a collapse in the overall demand for new technology,
not a shift towards greater domestic sourcing of technology.
The trend also indicates that Brazilian industry has become
increasingly disconnected from an important source of inputs
to enhance its international competitiveness. Something of
the significance of that can be glimpsed in the corresponding
data for South Korea. where payments for imported
technology (licensing and consultancy payments) were rising
rapidly as a proportion of GDP during the mid 1980s. That
reflects a longer trend through the 1970s and 1980s as
Korea strengthened its international competitiveness: during
that period, payments for imported technology massively
increased - 13-fold in absolute terms between 1972-76 and
1982-86 (KDB 1988, Hobday 1991).
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This highlights one of the major technology-related
challenges now faced: the need to reverse the recent trend
of technology imports. Rapid growth of imported technology
must be set in motion, so re-connecting industry to
international sources of technology. The driving force at the
heart of this growth must be a corresponding resurgence of
investment in new plant and equipment incorporating the
new vintages of technology required to enhance
competitiveness across the whole spectrum of industry. That
revival of industrial investment will depend heavily on macro-
economic conditions.
But there is a second challenge that is the main focus
of this paper. This is not about the ‘quantity’ of technology
acquired from abroad; it is about how that technology is
acquired. If increased volumes of imported technology are to
play their full potential role in enhancing competitiveness in
the 1990s,it will be totally inadequate just to go back to the
typical ways of acquiring technology in the past. Those
approaches must beradically altered. There are two reasons
for this.
First, there is now much greater understanding about
the process of technological change, its role in the
competitiveness of industry, and its interaction with
technology imports. This understanding, a benefit from
hindsight that was not then widely available, suggests that
the dominant approaches to acquiring foreign technology in
Brazil in the period up to the 1970sfailed to exploit its full
potential. Different approaches will be needed in the 1990s
if any increase in the ‘quantity’ of imported technologyis to
contribute as effectively as it might to the competitiveness
of Brazilian industry.
Beyond that, an obvious but important point is that the1990s are not the 1970s and the international context fortechnology acquisition by Brazilian firms is now radicalldifferent. The rates, directions and processes of
10
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technological change have fundamentally altered, as have
the opportunities and constraints facing firms seeking to
acquire technology in the international ‘market’. These
changes are a further set of reasons for radically changing
Brazilian industry’s earlier approaches to the acquisition of
imported technology.
The most evident implications of these two points are
for the dynamic evolution of industrial enterprises. In
summary, managing the acquisition of imported technology
will have to be linked into much moreintensive and strategic
investments in the firms’ own resources for generating and
managing their technological dynamism. These enhanced
investments in innovative capabilities will be required not as
alternatives to technology imports, but as essentiaf
complements that will be needed to gain the greatest
possible competitive benefits from what is imported. Indeed,
they will be needed even to gain any access atall to some
areas of foreign technology.
There are, however, implications for governmentpolicy
as well. In part, these are about continuing the changes in
economic policy that have sought to bring greater
competitive pressures to bear on enterprises. Also, they are
about other measures designed to overcomethelimitations
of market mechanisms in stimulating ‘optimal’ investments
in knowledge and related intangible assets - measures that
will (i) enhance the technological responses that firms make
to greater competitive pressures in the shorter run, and (ii)
increase the extent to which they create the technological
basis for new areas of competitiveness in the longer run.
The dominant approaches to acquiring imported
technology since the 1950s have been characterised, with a
few notable exceptions, by two basic features. Technology
imports were typically disconnected from significant
innovative activity in the technology importing firms: they
were usually not preceded, accompanied, or followed by
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substantial complementary research, development or
engineering efforts (Erber 1981; Coutinho and Ferraz 1994).
As a consequence, technology imports were only rarely
assimilated into continuous Processes of rapid technical
change. Obviously, they wereoften followed by some degree
of improvement in Process efficiency and product
performance, as ‘learning-by-doing’ and minor adaptation
occurred, but the intensity of such ‘incremental’ technical
change was often inadequate to sustain competitiveness intechnologically dynamic international markets, and it rarelycreated new bases of competitiveness in progressively highervalue-added activities.2
Some of the new understanding about technology,innovation, international technology transfer and industrialcompetitiveness that has become more widely accessiblesince the 1970s Suggests that these aspects of Brazilianexperience were neither inevitable nor similar to theexperience of a few other industrialising economies that have
exploited imported technology much more effectively. These
issues are outlined in Section 2. Section 3 then examines
features of the international context for technologyacquisition in the 1990s. It emphasises the significance ofnew challenges that stem from the combination of (i) newPatterns and processes of technical change (the so-called‘New techno-economic paradigm’), and (ii) new factors thatmay influence both the accessibility of foreign technologyand the terms ofits acquisition. Section 4 summarises theNew approaches to Management and policy that will beneeded if Brazilian industry is to exploit the full contributionto competitiveness that Can be made by importedtechnology.
12
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2. NEW UNDERSTANDING ABOUT TECHNOLOGY,
COMPETITIVENESS AND INTERNATIONAL
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
The approaches to technology management and policy
in Brazil were, as in other countries, heavily influenced by
pervasive and often very simple ideas about how
technological innovation and international technology transfer
contribute to industrial growth and competitiveness.
However, as new understanding has been generated over
the last two decades, the ‘mental models’ that influenced
managers and policy-makers in the 1960s and 1970s have
become outdated and misleading in many aspects.
One dominantissue is about the central role of business
enterprises in generating the technological dynamism of
industry. This may seem self-evident in the 1990s, butit
was much less obvious in the 1960s and 1970s. At that
time, in Brazil, as in most other industrialising countries,
considerable emphasis was placed on infrastructure
institutions as the prime movers of domestic innovative
activity. It was expected that they would be able to generate
new technology on behalf of industrial firms that were seen
as being too small, too foreign or too incompetent to
generate their own.
That simple optimism about the potential role of
technological institutions stemmed partly from
correspondingly simple views about the nature of technology.
Apart from the elements that are embodied in people by
education and training, technology was either seen as
‘information’ that could be transmitted fairly easily between
organisations, or it was viewed as being embodied in
machinery which could be bought and sold like any other
goods. However, we now understand a bit more about the
complexity of industrial technology. In particular, much of it
is tacit and inherently difficult to transmit; and much of it is
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highly specific to particular firms and their markets. Those
firms themselves must therefore play the prime-moverrole intechnological development.
This point is evident from the structure of R&D activityin the industrialised countries, especially the moretechnologically dynamic ones like Germany and Japan, whereenterprises fund very large Proportions of total industrial R&Dand execute even larger proportions. It is also evident indramatic transformations of the structure of R&D fundingthat have occurred over the last two decades in some of theEast Asian NICs. In South Korea, for instance, governmentaccounted for nearly 70 per cent of total R&D expenditurein 1975. By 1985, despite huge increases in the absolutelevel of government expenditure, that share had fallen toabout 20 per cent, with non governmental sources (mainlyindustrial enterprises) accounting for 80 per cent.
In principle, the central importance of industrialenterprises as the driving force in technological developmenthas already been well recognised in Brazil - for instance, inSeveral of the policy statements of the early 1970s - and theissue therefore needs only brief emphasis here.
The same can be
by which one
industrial tech
Said about anotherissue: the criteriawould assess the macro-economic impact ofnology imports. In the 1960s and 1970s, theominant perspectives centred in growth and structuralChange. In Brazil, as
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By the 1990s, however, that perspective has changed.
The experience of many economies, especially Ilion
America, Eastern Europe and the former USSR, has reacated
the high costs that may be associated with long periods oO
emphasis on growth and structural change as the dominant
objectives of industrial development. Much greater attention
is now given to issues about international competitiveness
and the efficiency of resource use in industrial growth.
Questions about management and policy concerned with
acquiring imported technology are increasingly addressed in
that context: the key issues are about developing approaches
that will more effectively link imported technology to rising
industrial efficiency and competitiveness.
This section starts from that point and concentrates on
six key issues where available new understanding mustlace outdated perspectives in developing more effectiverep hes for acquiring imported technology: (i) to createapproaches industrial competitiveness, technical changeand sustain continuous, not intermittent, process; andmust pe echnology must be incorporated into thatimporte technological dynamism; (ii) ‘adopters’ andcontinuous chnology play active and creative, not passive,‘users’ 0 snerating these trajectories of competitiveroles in hee dynamism; (iii) the resource base needed totechnologic change-generating technological roles includesplay noseeructures of firms, not just individual firms actingrereimological isolation, and a very wide range ofin tec no and other capabilities, not just R&D capabilities;enginesring& firms play important roles as creators andtiv) indus not just employers, of the human resourcediffusers.| of those wide-ranging technological capabilities;COONSay imports and local innovative capabilities are(v) technowe not alternatives, in the process of technicalcompleme market mechanisms and governmentinterventionchange; complements, not alternatives, in providing theare ey framework of inducements for investment in
aeshnology accumulation in industrialising economies.
15
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2.1 TECHNICAL CHANGE: A Continuous, Nor INTERMITTENT,
Process
In the 1960s and 1970s, technical change was seenessentially as an intermittent phenomenon. Such views wereencouraged by two sets of ‘models’ of how technology isincorporated into economic activity. One centred on the roleof technology and investment in the process of economicgrowth, and the other on the Process of innovation.
2.1.1. TECHNOLOGY, INVESTMENT AND Economic Growtn
Common analyses of economic growth not onlyemphasised the importance of investment in physical capital
as the vehicle for incorporating technology in production.
They also tended to view such capital-embodied technical
change as involving infrequent and relatively large ‘lumps’ ofinvestment - in effect, distinct new plant and factories.3 Atthe same time, these views about intermittent injections oflarge lumps of Capital-embodied technology were often set(sometimes only implicitly) within the framework of ‘putty-Clay’ models of technical progress: the technicalcharacteristics ‘embodied’ in particular vintages of capitalere assumed to be fixed by the time of investment projects,a .
sce ne further technical progress would occur in theSequentlifetimes of those facilities.
Also, the proj ; UP New plantstheir ba oolect feasibility Studies which th and factoriesNKS and ministries almost €y examined in
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a set of technical (and hence economic) characteristics which
remained fixed through the projected 10-20 yearlifetimes of
the projects.
2.1.2. THE Process OF TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
Emerging from a different tradition, common models of
innovation led in very similar directions. They focused on
individual product and process innovations - intermittently
occurring phenomena that emerged from a Sequence of
research and developmentactivities. In the 1960s and early
1970s, therefore, most of the empirical analysis that sought
to clarify the main features of the innovation process focused
on individual innovations - distinct new products and proces-
ses that were examinedin isolation from both preceding and
subsequent paths of technical changes (e.g. Sherwin and
Isensen 1967, Myers and Marquis 1969, Langrish et al.
1972, and SPRU 1972). These perspectives also
incorporated a feature that was very similar to the
economists’ putty-clay distinction: the separation between (i)
the various stages leading up to innovation (the first
commercial application of the new technology), during which
the evolving technology was creatively shaped; and (ii) the
subsequent stage of diffusion, during which it was presumed
to remain fixed as a succession of users simply ‘adopted’
and ‘used’ it as it diffused through the economy.
Thus, within both these perspectives, technical change
was seen as stemming from intermittent ‘injections’ of
technology into the economy.In addition, both Perspectives
involved sharp boundaries between (i) technologically
creative phases of activity in advance of the injections, and
(ii) technologically static, ‘post-injection’ phases during which
the technology was diffused and used, but not changed.
Industry in developing countries was usually seen as acting
on the technologically static sides of those boundaries. {t
INstrTUTO DE Economia, UFRJ
was involved in the ‘adoption’ of given technologies as theydiffused internationally after Garlier innovation in theadvanced industrial economies; and, after the investment
as a raenational technology transfer was seen, therefore,
intermittent! : vo affair. It was just a channel used
specifications 0 Provide/acquire some or all of the product
know-how and bonnes designs, Capital goods, operatingtechnologies ao forth that were needed to adopt particular
Projects, th Elly seen as ‘inputs’ for investment
i fe te forms of technology were needed for the
of setting up new Production capacity at
Concerned with shortinputs and their cosany longer term
-term issues about these project-linked
rating lifetimes of particularplante as Significant as the gains) 9 1 "Corporating complete new9 evidence to ; . 1962) had also provided
4 pointlin this cag “Ae Economic gaine #000° PY Rosenberg
NS from Major innovations
€a SUCCegsgjon
& Matched byne Petroleum refining proces-
Sains from continuing
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improvement to each of those innovations during their
subsequent diffusion and use.
Since then, a wealth of evidence has been accumulated
to indicate the importance of seeing technical change as a
continuous, not intermittent, process. This has been
associated with fundamental changes in the basic
frameworks used in theoretical and empirical analysis of
innovation and technical change, and, during the 1980s,
attention came to focus muchless on individual innovations,and much more on paths of technological learning,
trajectories of innovation, and
cumulative
sequences of
technical change (e.g. Dosi 1988 and Imai and Baba 1989).
These altered perspectives on the dynamics of
technical change have been associated with radical shifts in
perspectives about the underlying processes. While neo-
classical perceptions identified technology as being freely
available for choice by all firms, more empirically informed
perspectives in the neo-Schumpeterian tradition have
emphasised quite different perspectives: a large Proportion
of the stock of technical knowledge is tacit and highly
specific to particular firms and markets, andits accumulation
depends heavily on highly localised learning processes
(Atkinson and Stiglitz 1969, Nelson and Winter 1982).
One consequenceofthis clarification of the continuous
and localised nature of the innovation process is that one
can no longer view the management of technology imports
as simply a matter of securing one-off ‘injections’ of
technology at least cost. It must focus on the more complex
task of ensuring that imported technology is incorporated
into, and contributes to, a continuing Process of
technological dynamism.
In addition, it no longer make much sense to draw neat
distinctions between technologically creative ‘Producers’ of
technology on the one hand and technologically passive
‘adopters’ and ‘users’ on the other; and it makes even less
Instiruto pe Economia, UFRJ
sense to presume that firms in industrialising countriesnecessarily fall into the latter category.
2.2 THE Active AND CREATIVE ROLES oF TECHNOLOGY ‘Users’
With technical change now more clearly identified as acontinuous process, it has become quite evident that thediffusion of innovations does not involve the adoption anduse of technologically fixed Products and processes. Instead,in technologically dynamic Situations, it typically involvestwo stages of technical change in each Successiveapplication of the diffusing technology.
First, the basic features of the technology to be usedin investment in new Production ili
This typically entails a comple
development, design and
Specifications of the producti
technologically creative Process whichis totasimple terms like
Choice”,
X process of engineering
ré-configuration of the
aS commonly
ment in ap arennomic gams from this
P ntly Given” technologies.
g meectiv has typically obscured0
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. esting that the improvementthe underlyingprocesses,pystata Sroduct of experience
nroc, »earning by doing’. In practice, that experience
through ery little significance, and the so-called learningeffect has V venerated by continuing paths of creative
curves ohange that are obviously associated with growing
cvperiencs but not simply as an automatic result of it (Bellex '
and Scott-Kemmis 1990).
. onents of the so-called diffusionAs integral3types of technical changeare widespread
Pee e. They are a feature of technologically dynamicand tryin both developed and developing countries -industry i ithin both groups, some countries appear to
although, w aths of change moreintensively than others.5pursue these x continuous change are also common acrossThese Ptfloret industries - for example the semiconductorwidely di "tthe brick industry, the machinery industry andindustry an | industry, the textile industry and the stealthe chemiv2 also appear to be common across differencesindustry. T vies - for example, in the production of high-within indus oated steels in large integrated plantsand theperformaootetandard construction reinforcing bar in small-production 0 ills’, or in the production of semiconductors atscale “frontier” as well as in the assembly of circuit boards
otvarious distances behindit.®
. ical change that neglect thesePersprlveSnamiedimensions of the diffusion processtechnologica Yall part of the way technology and technicalsee only “t the competitiveness of firms and industries.
aaa sbscure the significantly creative roles played byThey a8 4 adopters and users of technology. These rolesthe so-ca at in the first of the two stages of technicalare importad above: investment in new production facilities.change no frequently draws on a range of suppliers forThis oOods engineering services, project managementcapteond ‘so forth; but technologically dynamic firmsserv
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into existing Production
ften draw on inputs from, the technology-using firm itself must playa significant role - both independently and in interaction withexternal suppliers,
Performance standards, or forting Specifications. Firms mustorms of knowledge, skill and
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n if we accept the rather narrow view tadate
titiven s of Brazilian firms will depend on t os
Seatesealeesas ters and users of technology generated by
abla °*sisewhere (not on their ability to generate
venient schnological innovations themselves), we now
roatied his has very different implications from those we
KOee in the 1970s. In particular, firms will need
helene chap nificant change-generating technological
. sutiasvatden ownin order to play those roles.cap
:
S In ERACTING2 3 THE Reso RCE BASE FOR |ECHNICA AT Cl C
C H NGE
NO | IVIDUAL, F IRMS AND 'E NGINEERING’ MORE THAN
&DND’ 1
R
i tance of the technologically
By the 1990s, me lesey dopters’ and ‘users’ has
Saari eel Seeeealia as the fact that oe
bayeme:titten rate by interactions between firms as muc
aire 7 Fiualfirme themselves. Some of these interactions
st eens and customers in the input-output chain -
MNe OOo hnological relationships (Lundvall 1988 and
OeyoEen, 1890) Many others, however, involve a wide
eeorte inalocy collaboration arrangements between
Norn, ri ‘os well as complementary firms (Chesnais 1988,
Aeronen« a 1992, Kleinknecht and Reijnen 1992, Lastres
sere i edoorn and Schakenraad 1992). Thus, an
1993, ane ot the resource base for industrial technical
LEie Pet ict the technological capabilities of individual
Oei ha complex structure of change-generating
ee i a Gane the technological capabilities of firms.interaction
chnological capabilities? In theBut were those cassia,wanll rarely have been1960s and a time, the nature of the resources required toasked. At eeeal change seemed obvious: they were R&Dgenerate noha various activities defined as research andSeenisl development were clearly identified in theexperim
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to innovative activity; and
, together with bi-istance agencies, were busy advising
al capabilities (or
bly unhelpful since itthe activities and resourceschange. Clearly major
of the Process of technolonote of a Point that has
Primary task is the Ongoing Operati
existing Production Systems May a
Contributions to the Process of techni
on an
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SEeet ak he acquisition of imported Saat wi
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structure of industrial firms. And, sometimes with only
Passing reference to ‘o n-the-job-training’, firms themselves
Other Perspectives have emphasised ‘learning by doing’
as an important mechanism for creating these types of
knowledge and human Capital; and recognition of the
Significance of tacit knowledge has highlighted the
importance of ‘doing’ as a means of learning. However, two
Caveats should be noted about the role of learning by doing.
Organised in jn i
Design Offices
SERIE TEXTOS PARA DiscussAo
i a by-product of activities
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kuin fothuretare likely to be significant un er-
ane eS a social, and possibly also private,
epeea semen these ‘externalities’ should not be seen
problems (fallures whtheyexe i
ola isms). Instead,
tfetvenes af chanpsltfertooeccvalletion ang Con
Son onecenet ting knowledge and skills in industry, an
of Oemioht be: found to enhancetheir significance, bymechanism neke invest in creating these kinds of human
eeeichbemdely in excess of their private needs.capita
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a PLE ENTAR Y | TECH NOLOGY Impor S AND Domes cT ECHNOLOG CAL Capasit IES
‘ ialising economié Thi
Bee ini
s. This was areememe Within the influential ‘dependency’S of the 1960s and 1970s. Technology importswere considered as 5 iubstitutes for domesti
_ ‘
ic tSqueezed out( Marginalised’) nas SootheCapabilities. The volume of ibee be controlled as one meevelopment of those Capabilities.
The former, h» NOwever, are usually presu
Ai
med to be high-and low-efficiency Sources; and any measures te fectProtthem and stimulate their development instead
o
f
d irawing onin Ported technolo y therefor impo eore
é . g
s s a burden on
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industrialising countries of the developing world. At the same
time, a significant proportion of the ‘innovations’ developed
by firms in industrialised countries involve large elements of
imitation of technology already developed in other countries
(De Melto et al. 1980, Smith and Vidvei 1992, and Deiacg
1992), and a large amount of R and D in the developed
countries is also ‘imitative’: that is, it is performed ta
monitor, assimilate and modify the technological
developments of competitor firms that are often located in
other countries (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen and Levinthal,
1989).
This highlights two issues. First, there is often no clear-
cut distinction between the kinds of activities and resources
required for ‘innovation’ and so-called ‘imitation’. Second,
the argument that importing foreign technology and creating
it locally are alternative (substitutable) means for generating
technical change does not reflect the experience of these
countries, where technology imports and local technological
accumulation have in fact been complementary. This has
taken several forms.
Imported technology can contribute directly to technical
change without there being any significant involvement of
local technological capabilities. More often, only some
elements of the necessary total combination of technology
are imported and are combined with elements generated
locally. The experience of European countries in the
development of the North Sea oil industry in the 1970s
illustrates both these patterns. In the early years of the
‘infant industry’, projects drew directly and almost totally on
American technology, but this was followed by a rapid
transition to more indirect patterns in which imported and
locally developed elements were combined (Bell and Oldham,
1988).
Even when technical change depends heavily and
directly on technology imports, these may be complemented
Instituto pe Economia. UFRJ













industry in the ea
designs and the
complemented by |
cumulate locally the technological
quently for improving what was
for generating elements of technology to
imported elementsin later projects, or for
independent Position in the long term
€ technology. This, for example, was the
by the US Du Pont corporation when it
n industry in the 1920s on the basis of
ogy (Hollander 1965). It was also very
arly industrialisation experience of Japan.
has shown this in the case of the
he chemical industry between the 1870s
in the development of the shipbuilding
tly part of this century, the licensing of
acquisition of foreign expertise was
arge investmentsin skill and know-howfor developing and improving what was initially acquired fromOverseas, not just for using it (Fukasaku 1986). Similarly,technology acquisition from foreign firms was necessary inthe early development of the automobile, electrical andrailway rolling stock industries, but localised reverseengineering was also a major channel for accumulatingProduct design and development capabilities oncelocal firmshad mastered Production and component technologies(Nakaoka 1987; Odagiri and Goto 1992; Lastres 1994) ofexpenditure on imported technology by Japanese firms wasmore than matched bytheir comple
The process of importinpreceded, not just followed, b
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thetic fibre production with licensed eeenoley ee
nreceded by substantial investment in R & D and rela
engineering activities (Ozawa 1980).
Imported technology also contributes then
accumulation itself, and not just to technical c weythrecge
i ious when technology imports are acquire th "
hn Sonal d informal channels - as with the training o
secianene oe s or research scientists in foreign universities
oui marluenitee, It is often less visible in commercial
tochnclooy nsactions betweenfirms - for instance, when
pate aet rocess specifications is accompanied by
we reid a ing design data, training in design routines,
Stoneerton ties to acquire experience in design projects.
are  reornational learning arrangements blur into various
puch attet national technological collaboration between
oh ‘od objectives of such linkages and networks
firms. The less concerned about relocating existing
pants dexpertise from one firm to another and more
sBontenolic intangible assets to develop new elements of
2vnolown n Nevertheless, these arrangements may then be
eeemmechneen for transferring internationally thei r
resutting new technology.
The challenge for managers seeking to eee
| into the technological dynamism of t eir irms ig
ar eit hese kinds of complementarity, especially the
ae i i earlier, a few Brazilian firms have already
ara ‘inawative ways of doing so. The challenge for
rienveataley is to stimulate a very much larger number
alem to follow similar approaches.
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2.6 Complementarity II: MARKETS AND GOVERNMENTS
Much of the analysis of innovation and internationaltechnol]Ogy transfer in the 1960s and 1970s lacked anyreference to the market contexts in which those activitiestook place. Thatis no longer the case, and issues about thenature of markets are now often central to analyses of in-dustrial innovation, international transfer and theaccumulation of technological capabilities.
Emphasis on that issue is not just a reflection of a-Priori presumptions. It is sustained by important empiricalevidence. For example, the importance of competitivePressures and rivalry as an incentive for technologicalaccumulation emerges from studies of the origins ofCompetitiveness (for example, Porter 1990), and fromStatistical studies of the technological activities of theworld’s large firms (Patel and Pavitt, 1992). Conversely analmost complete lack of competitive pressures was onefeason why production units in centrally planned economieshad no incentive to develop or adopt more efficienttechniques.
Nevertheless, it is also evid
intervention in competitive mar
government shaping of thej
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producers in more industrialised countries. The oblective Was
ble firms to learn and master the technologies
° ved and the extent and duration of protection variedinvolve some cases, it was provided only for relativelywidely. ode - as in the case of the Japanese synthetic fibreshort perio the 1950s (Ozawa, 1980). In othersit persistedindustry in iods - sometimes with questionable justificationfor long Priocal learning. But at other times the persistence
at prote ti n seems to have been an apparent necessity for
of proteono ffective mastery of the technology involved (e.g.
developing : of the Japanese automobile industry). Morein the oede policy has been used in this flexible way
recent h rapid industrialisation of South Korea: protectionduring the rovided for limited periods to permit ‘thehas ans of a level of technological and other capabilitiesaccumu . r competitive survival, and industries have thenrequired sed to the pressures of international competitionbeen ondWestphal 1986). However, such patterns of trade(Pee ction were usually accompanied by other measures toeee the accumulation of significant technological
capabilities.
2.6.2. EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND RESEARCH
Nearly all governments in market cconomies nave 8
similar core of policies that are designed exp sndl“thes
influence the rate and direction of technical change, an
are j stified because they correct market failure. In particu-
iar, several areas of governmentpolicy have poused on re
vation of new knowledge through research, an on the
‘if ion of existing knowledge through education and
“_ since there are significant externalities in both these
sativities in the sense that the full benefits are not
ccessarily appropriable by the firms investing in them.
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With respect to research, all the industrialised countriesHave developed institutions outside firms for generating newindustrial knowledge and information. Some of these havebeen private commercial institutions (contract researchBepsations, industry-funded co-operative R&D centres, andhet but many have been public or quasi publiclions (universities, government research laboratories,these institutionte R &D centres, etc.). In a trivial sense,outputs ot S are complements to industrial firms: theirp of knowledge are Inputs to firms. More significant,however,is the complementarity of innovative activity in thetwo sets of institutions. Reflecting the points made earliervery rare for 3the Primary driving force in innovation, it isfor the innan , rastructure institutions to act as substitutesForay and t Ve activities of firms themselves (Foray 1993,generate on| Owery 1989). Much more commonly, theythatfirms » Y pome elements of the overall knowledge setshave found th to generate technical change. Several studiesactivities of at the firms that make most use of the R & Dcompensar, these kinds of institution are not seeking tocapabilitn © for the absence of their own technologicalhouse R z tea, they are firms that have significant in-nowledac ; of their own, and they are seeking specificactivitic -Moots to complement those in-house innovative
and S (Mowery 1983, Arora and Gambardella 1990, BellOldham 1988, Kleinknecht and Reijnen 1992).
The contribution of government has been Particularlylarge in the area of investment in education and trainingThis has not been limited to the provision of infrastructurefacilities (schools, universities, training centres etc.), but hinvolved measures to stimulate the training and | neefforts of firms themselves. At least in the “I
34
Série TExTos parA Discusséo
The costs and risks of technical change and
technological learning vary with the ‘distance’ of the jumps
being attempted from existing bodies of technological
competence. Drawing on the industrialisation experience of
Japan, Nakaoka (1987) points out that governmentpolicies
assisted firms making relatively large ‘jumps’ during early
learning phases by providing finance to cover risk, funds for
training in the appropriate skills, and a market for the
products developed during the learning processes. Ozawa
(1980)illustrates similar forms of intervention in the case of
the entry of Japanese firms into the synthetic fibre industry
in the early post-war years: the government created
conditions which not only reduced market risks but alsa
stimulated firms to intensify investmentin their technologica}
capabilities alongside their investment in new production
capacity. However, a significant dimension of that
government role is better described as ‘shaping’ the market
in the first place rather than just intervening in its operations.
2.6.3. SHAPING THE MARKET
A frequent and important feature of government policy
as late-industrialising Japan entered successive new
industries was the regulation of entry. This usually involved
some combination of limiting the number of firms, phasing
the sequence of their entry, and designating criteria for
selecting entrants that included significant issues concerned
with their technological capabilities and management of
technology acquisition. These entry regulating measures
were often combined with (i) temporary limits on the extent
of domestic and/or foreign competition, but also (ii) the
predictable termination of those limits.
The primary explicit objective of such measures was
usually to ensure that firms set up production plants at the
most efficient scale and then operated them at full Capacity.
Z5
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However, an additional important consequence was thatSubstantial incentives were provided for investment in thetechnological capabilities required to generate and managetechnical change. Nakaoka (1987), for example, describesone example of this approach: the development of therailwayrolling stock industry between 1900 and 1920. Apartfrom playing a major role in accumulating and then diffusing
Ww . + egagons and carriages. What wassignificant about this was
nF‘aeat It limited competition, but that it shifted the timingense inter-firm competition: firms not only competedentering Production, they competed intensely before
limited humbe. be able to enter. Moreover, the selection of
large enou a of entrants ensured that the firms were
Capabilit; gh to accumulate substantial technological
mies, and hence to incorporate a significanttechnology-centred di i i iImension n their competition.Nakaoka describesit:
° ne AS
Competitnnonated manufacturers were always plural.
manufact was an essential factor in the process. Though
firms, th uring Opportunities were restricted to designated
to alllo oheoanity to become a designated firm was open
oth cal tirms. Many ambitious firms competed with each
er to become a designated firm and, after being
designated, competed to manufacture a better locomotivethan others. (p.17)
Ozawa (1980) describes a similar example somethirtyyears later when Japan entered successive segments of thSynthetic fibre industry in th :
stry In the 1950s and early 1960s In thisCase, entry was usually staggered - with only one firInitially permitted to enter segment that Was protected f ninternational competition, but with Subsequent ent “byothers and/or the elimination of protection from intern ti aMpetitors being quite Predictable at that Stage Ozawa- Ozawa
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indicates that this had striking implications for the way
Japanese firms approached the acquisition of foreign
technology:
Clearly there have been many benefits from the
strategy, with the staggered-entry formula particularly
enhancing the Japanesefirms’ ability to absorb sophisticated
foreign technologies. To be qualified as an early entrant, a
firm had to demonstrate its technological and financial
capabilities to assimilate the latest technologies. Therefore
the industrial groups competed in searching for new
promising technologies, conducting preparatory research,
finding an appropriate foreign licenser, and securing the
necessary investment funds.
The preparatory research often consisted of ‘backward
engineering’ and ‘patent-literature-based reproduction’. These
approaches enabled Japanese firms, first, to know the real
merits and demerits of a new foreign technology; second to
prepare themselves technologically to absorb only the desired
components of foreign technology (...thereby enhancing their
bargaining power in negotiating with the supplier); and third,
often to come up with significant technological
improvements in the course of ‘reproduction’.
... the Staggered-entry formula also served to strengthen
the bargaining position of Japanesefirms in negotiating with
foreign technology suppliers, because only one (or at most
a selected few) was permitted to enter a new industry at a
time. (p.146)
Blind adherence to views that governments should not
intervene in markets would neglect these aspects of
Japanese experience in which governments shaped the
structure and functioning of markets in ways that enhanced
effectiveness in acquiring and dynamically assimilating
foreign technology.
27
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Similarly, blind adherence to views about the‘importance of protectionist trade policy as a means of
Enhancing technological ‘learning’ would ignore the related
aspects of Japanese experience in which competitive
eaures (in particular forms) played a major role in
foreignteense approaches to the acquisition of
espects of th<ogy. It might also lose sight of two other
knowledge and experience: (i) active investment in acquiring
asis for tech loceetae (not just ‘doing’) was the main
‘doing’ was a ogical learning; and (ii) to the extent that
kinds of doin Povtant for that learning, it was particularand im Ing Ose concerned with designing, developing




PINg approaches to policy in Brazil in the
MS essential not to fall into either of thesemore useful pusanerents to outdated preconceptions. Muchhew ways SS . also much more challenging, will be to findand gover, Xploit the complementarities between marketsalso ways ie - ways that are designed for Brazil, butinterna at are designed for competitiveness in thenational context of the 1990s and beyond.
3. THE INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT FOR
This part of the paper examines two aspects of theinternational context for technology acquisition by Brazilitirms. The first, examined in Section 3.1, is ab thePatterns and processes of technical change thathavee
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new conditions that may be faced by Brazilian firms as they
seek to acquire technology through international channels.
The main implications of these are about what firms will
have to do before they get imported technologies -
approaches to strategy, management and organisation that
may be needed to acquire technology efficiently in the first
place, or even to acquire it all.
First, however, it is important to note two other
features of the international context: the increasing
integration of trade and technology policies at the
international level; and key changes in the international
structure of production and trade.
Technology and trade policy issues have become
increasingly integrated, during the 1980s; and, as
technology-intensive industries have become more central in
the managed trade environment of bilateral negotiations and
disputes, developing countries are suffering the dual
difficulties of (i) greater difficulty in exporting their own
goods, and (ii) the slow diffusion of new technologies.
Also, under significant changes in the economic and
political balance of power among developed countries in the
late 1980s, a new series of international rules and
agreements have been negotiated. Examples include not only
new bilateral and regionalinitiatives (such as the various US-
Japanese agreements and the EEC) but also attempts to
change multilateral agreements (such as the ‘Uruguay Round‘
of GATT). While developing countries are participating more
actively in these new multilateral agreements than they did
in the major post-war arrangements, such agreements are
being negotiated under two very distinct principles. On the
one hand, the North-North bilateral and regional agreements
have been increasingly influenced by a concept of ‘fair
trade’, whereby access to markets dependsonits effects on
the economic structure of the recipient countries/regions. At
the same time, various forms of protection are provided for
high-technology industries; and, as noted by one analyst:
Instruto bE Economia. UFRJ
.-free trade in high-technology products is a largelymeaningless option - the real policy choice is not betweenfree-trade and protection but between appropriateCombinations of liberalization and government interventionthat improve national economic welfare in the short run andSustain a more open international trading system in the longfun. (Tyson 1992).
f In contrast, in North/South relations the old concept offree trade’ has been pushed further and focused on areasrelated to new technology (such as intellectual propertyrights and services). Thus protectionism and marketliberalisation are treated unevenly in North-South relations.The North accepts the principle of Protecting both matureindustries and novel technologies, while (i) seeking variousforms of market access in the South and (ii) disputing thevalidity of Southern (‘fair’, it might be argued) structures ofProtection and other measures to enhance technologicaldevelopment. The South must respond to changingInternational Structures of production, trade and technology-based Competition within that kind of imbalance in ideologyland power) - an issue that may become increasingly'Mportant for Brazil in particular.
‘ Brazilian industry is now competing in a changing‘International structure of production and trade - an issue that
wn, but merits constant re-emphasis in anydiscussion of technology and industrial competitiveness. ThePoint is €specially important in the context of structural
Changes in Brazilian industry itself. These have involvedShifts towards two areas of current comparative advantage:
Partly, towards labour-intensive industries,
Substantially towards industries that are natural resource-
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Rapidly growing production in other countries with
lower wagerates andrising skill levels is likely to erode the
Competitiveness of labour-intensive products like shoes. In
Particular, an enormous potential threat is emerging for these
kinds of industry as very low labour costs in China are being
Combined with high levels of technical skill and international
Marketing expertise that have been accumulated by firms in
Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea. At the same time, many
other countries are increasing investment in the energy-
intensive and natural resource-intensive industries, most of
which are already suffering from excess capacity. In the
basic chemical industry, for instance, huge increases in
Capacity are expected in the Asian Pacific rim - especially in
China. International competition in these industries will be
Particularly intense for many years.
In these contexts, three broad types of response are
likely to be critical for sustaining competitiveness: intensive
efforts to achieve continuing increases in productivity and all
aspects of process efficiency in existing lines of production;
intensive efforts to raise product quality and move ‘upwards
to higher value-added products in the existing industries;
and, intensive efforts to develop new areas of
competitiveness in related products and industries - moving
‘downstream’ to higher value products and ‘upstream’ to
areas of specialised strength in machinery and equipment,
instrumentation, information systems and software,
engineering services, etc.
In short, within the changing international structure of
industrial production, the recently strengthened short term
Competitiveness of large segments of Brazilian industry
almost certainly cannot be sustained over the medium-to-
longer term by depending on the ‘spurious’ advantage of low
Wages and devaluation or on natural resource endowments.
It will depend increasingly on resources of knowledge,
expertise and institutional structures for generating and
41
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managing technical change- ‘created’ bases of comparative
advantage.
3.1 CHaNcING PATTERNS AND PROCESSES OF INDUSTRIALTECHNICAL CHANGE
The Preceding sections have emphasised that, if firmsare to achieve efficiency and competitiveness, they will have
to incorporate technology imports into trajectories ofcontinuous technological dynamism. More specifically,however, sustaining international competitiveness will require
those trajectories to generate rates of productivity increase
and product performance improvement that at least matchinternational rates. However, this requirement poses much
greater demandsthan in the past. In the international contextof the 1990s, the required rates of technical change appearto be greater; the necessary directions of change aredifferent and more complex; the underlying processes of
change will have to be driven by much greater investment in
firms’ own resources of knowledge and skill: and theOrganisational basis for change will have to involve moreintensive patterns of interaction and collaboration between
firms and related organisations.
3.1.1 THE INTENSIFICATION OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
During the import substitution period of the 1960s andearly 1970s, most of the technologies acquired byindustrialising countries like Brazil were relatively ‘mature’This was particularly true of technologies in sectors such asIron, steel and other metal Products, jPaper, and chemicals (especially bulk chem;: miseveral implications. cals). This had
42
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First, although competitive performance depended
heavily on both types of incremental technical change
discussed in the previous section (improvements incorporated
in new facilities at the time of investment, and further
improvements in the post-investment period), the intensity of
those kinds of change was relatively low, as was the
frequency of more substantial technological discontinuities.
Second, a large proportion of the specifications for
Products and processes could be embodied in relatively
Standardised capital goods, and could be transferred via
‘turn-key’ projects - with only limited needs for innovation
and design for application in specific circumstances. There
were correspondingly limited needs for local involvement in
the engineering and design activities involved in creating
new production systems.
Finally, most of the capabilities to use and operate the
given product and process technologies could berelatively
easily acquired via training in basic routines and a modest
amount of experience in ‘doing’ those routines.
There were therefore very limited requirements for
accumulating significant capabilities for generating and
Managing technical change, and those requirements were
even more limited in industries with persisting protection
against competing imports (and/or subsidies for exports) that
Shielded them from the effects of the continuing
improvements in these mature technologies that were being
generated in the international economy. In that context,
investmentin change-generating capabilities was more of an
‘optional extra’ that might be added to routine operating
Capabilities by a few firms for idiosyncratic reasons. Not
Surprisingly, however, the majority of firms took advantage
of the combination of technological maturity and protection/
Subsidy, and investedlittle in developing theirown resources
for developing, improving, creating and designing the product
and process technologies they used. The implications for
Competitiveness subsequently became evident.
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That international technological environment forBrazilian industry has changed fundamentally during the1980s. The whole spectrum of industries that were
technologically mature in the 1960s and 1970s has beenrejuvenated byradical changes in technology or (more often)by an intensification of more incremental forms of change-or by a combination of both. At the same time, of course,a wide range of new industries that were in their infancy inthe 1960s and 1970s have emerged on the basis of rapidtechnological development to play a substantial role ininternational Production and trade. As a result:
-.IN most areas of manufacturing, engineers are
onted with new criteria for dominant designs and mustadapt to new technological and industrial paradigms, someof which are compatible with earlier approaches to designand product Management, while others require a completebreak with previous procedures and ways of thinking.(Chesnais 1990:15-16)
confr
At the centre of this technological transformation lie arelatively small number of well-known areas of rapidtechnological development: micro-electronics and informationtechnologies; radical improvements in old materials and thedevelopment of new ones; and accelerating developments incell and molecular biology. Important as these are, theyshould not obscure the much wider diversity of intensifiedtechnical change across all industries, all activities within
them, and most of the technologies they use.
Part of this diversity involves process-centred changewith its implications for rising Productivity - increasingefficiency in the use of capital, labour, energy and materials,But other parts are reflected in intensified product-centred
(i) shortened the time gaps
discontinuities, (ii) reducedlife
:
-times and lead-times for lessradically novel Products, and (iii) widened the diversity of
Aa
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Smaller product differentiation. At the same time,
combinations of process-centred and product-centred change
have been directed more intensively at reducing
environmental costs per unit of industrial output - an
Objective that is being achieved increasingly by forms of
technical change that also reduce other unit costs.
As it emerges from the crises and macro-economic
instability of the 1980s, Brazilian industry therefore faces a
world in which the technological basis for competitivenessIs
totally different from that of the 1960s and 19708. The
Point is not simply that there now exist a large num er of
‘new technologies’ that were not available before. e mor
fundamental point is that the wholestructuretechnology
dering aay50s and1970s. Forsuchalargem in the Sa :
industrialwegen that did not match the eeoeaad
international rates of technical change in the 19 S and
1970s, competing in this new technological environmen
the 1990s constitutes a most formidable challenge.
3.1.2. THe IT-INTENSITY OF TECHNICAL CHANGE
Within the overall complex of intensified technical
Change, the importance and pervasive impact© , ect nies
and information technologies are well recognise an eee
No further emphasis here (see Freeman 199 a reren
review). However, three characteristics O Cc
technical change require a little elaboration.
First, to an extent that is perhaps greater than in other
areas of technical change, the incorporation of electronics
and IT elements into products, processes and organisationa
Systems seems to require direct user-involvement In
technology development and design. Compared with some
Other areas of technology, the application of many areas of
45




Ses, and their markets. T
technology requires much less
hat are highly specific to the
al firms, their products and proces-
hese system specifications are noteasily transferred in the form of ‘ready-made’ capital goods
and blueprints and their efficient introduction thereforerequires much more localised technical change. Moreover,that localisation must often go beyond the routine‘adaptation’ of Systems. It has to be deeply rooted indevelopment and design of the hardware, and especially theSoftware, in the immediate context of use. Also, since thatfrequently involves relatively complex engineering anddesign, the importance of tacit knowledge is oftenParticularly great (David 1992). In particular, however, whatis frequently involved is the integration of electronics/ITelements and systems within existing Products, processesand organisational Procedures, and large Proportions of thetacit and other knowledge needed for localised developmentand design must therefore be drawn from the ‘user’ of thoseelements and systems. Thus, the technology users frequentlyneed to play a Particularly significant and direct role in theProcess of technology development and design. Then, of
Second, most applications of electronics/informationtechnologies involve Systems and networks. This raisesimportant issues about ‘network externalities’ (Katz andShapiro 1983, Allen 1988), with Progressive diffusionyielding falling transactions costs (Williamson 1988) and
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be captured from implementing only parts of me tebehighjigsaw”, but it does suggest that there are tikely chnology.returns to rapid intra-firm diffusion One chnolosy areCorrespondingly, adopters and users of t ot simply in ‘thelikely to gain high returns to investment Fknowledge andtechnology’ itself, but in the bodies o in developingexpertise that are needed to interact with users
and extending their IT systems.
The network characteristics of IT systemsalso haveimportant implications at the overall ‘dual firms (asSignificant benefits accrue to indivi ) as the overall‘externalities’ from the actions of other imsee the total
density of IT adopters and users endmarket-linked firms.Population of geographically related aT systems increasesIn particular, the efficiency of using | fo,mation about the
with increasing local availability of (i) "od and experiencedtechnology from other users, (ii) a train and maintenanceWorkforce, (iii) technical assistance software,’ and (v)Services, (iv) suppliers of equim supplier-developed andCc innovations - . ae
user-generated and both technical and organisational.
s ofWithin such evolving structures aeerrronination
Collective learning, the diffusion of we the presence oftechnology is frequently accelerated ’demonstrators’ foradvanced user-firms that not only act as t of innovationsOthers, but also contribute to the development in the specificthat improvethe efficiency of the Toonaay Given theselocal context of their use (von Hippel in many of thePatterns, it is not surprising that public policy nificant role inadvanced industrial countries has played 3 technologies - inaccelerating the diffusion of information nce of efficient
Particular by stimulating the aent of user-producertechnology users and the developmen tion technology inlinkages. With respect to advanced automa blic institutions
Sweden, for example, public policy and pu tration plants’were crucial in setting up several ‘demonstra P
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partly financed by the National Board for Industrial and
Technical Development and the Board for Industrial
Development.
Third, information technology is not just an area of
changing technology, it is frequently also a powerful
instrument for generating innovation and technical change.
This is most obvious in the case of computer aided design
Systems which not only permit more rapid and frequent
changesin Product and process design, but also allow much
more intensive and extensive exploration of design options.
However, the same change-stimulating role of IT is evidentin other ways that ‘feed into’ product and processdesign. Inthe various types of development and research, IT systemsevidently play an enormously important role in accelerating
the generation of new knowledge, in acquiring existing
knowledge, and in developing new configurations oftechnology for incorporation into specific designs. Perhapsless evident is the change-stimulating role of IT when appliedin production and Management processes themselves. Forexample, the information that can be generated by varioustypes of advanced process control technology, combinedwith the power of advanced computing, allows theacceleration of incremental process improvements. Similarly,the knowledge generated by IT applications for organisationand administration permit more intensive analysis of changesin the ‘organisational technology’ of firms.
3.1.3. THE INCREASING SIGNIFICANCE OF ORGANISATIONAL
CHANGE
Although it has always been im
of change in the organisational
dustrial technology has become much morethe 1980s. Given the flood of publicationsJapanese management methods,
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on this issue -
Lean’ Production, ‘Flexible
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Specialisation’, and so forth there is no need here for any
general review (See Humphrey 1993 for a recent review t °
also includes several studies of Brazilian experience). Only
one point require emphasis.
Organisational change is frequently an important me
gral component of many other typesof technical change me
may appear to be centred primarily on ‘hardware’. s
seems to be particularly so in changes involving IT an
automation systems. For example, one survey about the
diffusion of flexible manufacturing systems (Hoffman 1988)
Provides evidence to show that most of the gains in
competitiveness arise from the preparation for, rather than
the implementation of, such systems. Bessant and Haywood
(1986) suggest that the extent of the benefits from the
organisational dimension of changeis around 75 per cent o
the total derived from flexible manufacturing.
This does not mean, however, that organisational
change can simply be substituted for investment in more
‘hardware-centred’ technical change. In the short run thatis
sometimes possible, especially when there is a large backlog
of organisational inefficiency to overcome. Indeed, there are
some cases where firms have found that substantial
Organisational change implemented in preparation for the
introduction of IT systems has made the latter redundant.
However, given the intensity of the overall multi-dimensional
Process of technical change in most industries,
competitiveness cannot be sustained for long on the basis
only of changesin the organisational dimension of production
technology.
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3.1.4. User-Probucer INTERACTIONS AND INNOVATION
We have earlier stressed the importance of the
technology ‘user’ as a creative contributor to the process of
technical change; and the importance of change-centred
interactions between technology users and producers has
already been emphasised with particular reference to
information technology. But the significance of these
interactions in raising the rate and effectiveness of technical
change in industry is much more comprehensive. The work
of Lundvall (1985 and 1992) on interactions between
innovation users and producers in a range of industries
emphasises that their geographical proximity constitutes a
competitive advantage. On the other hand, the absence of
effective user-producer interactions can lead to significant
inefficiencies (Glete 1984). The key to effectiveness is not
just the proximity of both agents but the ‘quality’ of their
interaction, which in turn seems to depend heavily on the
technological capabilities of the technology user as much asthose of the producer. Lundvall (1989-16-17) pointed out,
for example, that when producers dominate users (or whenusers have a limited technical competence) there has been atendency towards ‘hyper automation’ - that is, users are
faced with designs that do not meet their needs, and with
overly complex and costly Capital goods. In such cases,
instead of attaining productivity gains, automation leads to
diseconomies.°®
It is important to note that the significance of these
types of interaction appears to increase with (i) the
complexity of the information about technology that has to
be sent between the firms, (ii) the degree of non-
Standardisation of production, and (iii) the degree of
technological discontinuity involved in the innovation. In
other words,it appears to be much more Significant in thetechnological environment of the 1980s that it was in the
50
. us;
Série Textos para DiscussAo Moy, ve
Sugenl, Qe,
context of more stable technologies and standardised
Production in the 1970s.
The dynamic significance of these user-producer
interactions reinforces a point already made about
Conventional perspectives on the international isinot
technological labour - with innovation and techno aes
creativity concentrated in the advanced industrial cones
and technologically passive adopting and using concen that
in the developing world.’° Our earlier argument aehoe
such perspectives were misleading in a ei andinternational competitiveness on the part of acer s
users of technology in the developing world requires t ae
Contribute creatively to developing and auaone the
technologies they use. To that we must now maine
argumentthat, in the environment of the 1 990s, ; rc ae
importance of user-producer inferactiens Ca eo notincreased presence of technologically creative a hecauee
just users) in industrialising countries, Peebe Yenter ike
the importance of those interactions seems i : chnologiesearlier they occur in the life-cycles of the te
Concerned.
In other words, the developments of the 19808|
have
Changed the forum for debating a ke
y global issue: w ° her
to reinforce or to reduce the technological dualism oie
global economy in which (i) rich regions reap the ve vc
Jains of innovation within interacting aiindies
technologically creative firms and institutions, and i ins:
trial firms in the developing world specialise in bie
technologically passive adoption and use of technoi .
has mostly been created within structures oi ie
an
which they play no part. In the 1960s and early 708 tha
issue was on the agendaof ideological and politica isp te.
In the 1990s, especially in relatively advanced industri
alising
€conomies like Brazil, that same question must be on the
agenda of economic debate about efficiency and
Competitiveness.
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forgenet aspect of this is a shift away from subsidies
more focu capital costs and investment
aid, and towards
knowled se support for R&D, training and related
eage-centred activities (Cassiolato 1994).
3.2 Access. TO INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY:ocy NewCio PATTERNS AND
$.2.1. New Patterns or Otp Continutties?
inter Despite their obvious importance, key features of the
nternational transfer of technology have attracted only
limited systematic analysis over the last decade or so. This,
however, has not precluded numerous comments about the
emergence of new trends and patterns. Many of these
Suggest that industrialising countries face increasing
problemsin their efforts to acquire technology from the more
advanced industrial economies. In particular, the following
issues have been noted.
With innovation coming to depend onrising levels of
R&D expenditure, higher payments may be requi
red for
licensing and other forms of access to the technolog
ies
involved.
Changes in intellectual property rig
hts systems in the
industrialised countries, together
with pressures for more
stringent enforcement of those
regimes in industrialising
countries, are reinforcing such trends -
as well as bringing
into the scope of those systems areas
of technology
previously excluded (e.g. in software and biote
chnology).
The characteristics of some new technologies are
making them inherently more difficult to transfer. It has
been
suggested, for example, that many areas of informatio
n
technology involve particularly high levels of tacit and firm-
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specific knowledgethat are less easily transferred than more
1990. technologies (Dosi, Pavitt and Soete
The growing importance multi-firm collaborative
arrangements for developing new technologies across a wide
spectrum of industries, combined with the rising importance
of basic research in some areas, may hinder the access of
developing countries to the knowledge inv
olved.
Several studies have provided a reasonable of support
for such views. For example, drawing on interviews, the
UNCTAD Secretariat has suggested that royalty rates on
Patents and know-how maybe rising (UNCTAD 1992:152-
3); and Vickery (1990) has observed a relatively slow growth
of technology licensing as compared with other technology
transfer activities, such as imports of capital goods.
However, one can also find equally convincing arguments
that point in opposite directions.
With increasing R&D investment levels, often
associated with shorter product life cycles, th
ere are
Pressures to increase, not reduce, access to the tech
nologies
involved: “...innovators must reap profits faster, sometimes
by licensing their technology rather than by exporting it
or
Establishing affiliates abroad.” (Soete 1985)
More specific studies of the international diffu
sion of
advanced technologies like telecommunications systems
have Suggested that intense competition
among technology
leaders in international markets has push
ed monopolistic
Profits from innovations lower and lower, and that “the
@ppropriability’ of innovations has greatly declined in r
ecent
years.” (Antonelli 1991)
Advanced information and communication technologies
team enhance, not constrain, international access to
by theoY and this may be further increased, not reduced,
growing use of collaborative networks for technology
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development - networks into which firms in industrialising
countries may be incorporated. For example, Hindustan
Aeronautics in India and a leading UK aerospace company
have recently entered into a collaborative engineering design
Programme that will operate through a sophisticated network
of computers and Satellite links.
Advanced information technologies may well involvegreater elements of tacit knowledge and greater degrees ofuser-specificity, while yielding their greatest gains as total
System integration is achieved. But, at least in somesituations, this does not seem to have been a great obstacle
to their international diffusion, combined with (i) theirlocalised adaptation to meet user-specific requirements, (ii)their efficient application to yield significant benefits fromCumulative partial steps towards integration, and (iii) theirfurther development and improvement by users after initial
implementation. These characteristics can be identified inSome situations - for example, in the case of the portmanagement system in Singapore (Wanetal. 1992), just astheir virtual absence can be identified in others situations -for example, in the case of digital process control systemsin the petrochemical industry in Brazil (Carvalho 1992).Perhaps the key issues are less about any inherent generalcharacteristics of ‘new technologies’, and more aboutdifferences between the situations for which they areacquired and into which they are introduced.
In short, it is not clear that any broad generalisationscan usefully be drawn in these areas at this stage. In anycase, there are more focused arguments that may be moresignificant for some Brazilian industries. These are about theproblemsof limited access to technology that arise as firmsand industries in the NICs begin to approach Particularsegments of the international technological frontier. Forbean: it has been noted that some of the moretechnologi i i ;encountered“creasingpreciontyeoutt ast Asian navequiring technologies
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through international channels: firms in the acvancedcountries “are refusing to license the relevant techno ogysince they do not want to encourage direct soeO'BrienProducts which theyarestill producing themselves”, ( nen
1985:214). More recently, as Korea has pecom™ “shaveCompetitor, it has been suggested that Japanese hnolo y inbecome increasingly reluctant to sell or license ve nsand
key areas of components, software, capita there is amachinery (Business Week 1992). Moreover, formed acommon view in Korea that Japanese firms nave strategicConsensus (implicitly at least) not to Speers within
technology inputs to Korea. Indeed, some ods 1980s, theyKorea believe that, during the latter half ia ineansfen fromWere experiencing the ‘tail end’ of tnheat e JapaneseJapan, and they claim that in some cases, the . : their ownConglomerates have begun not only to om etitors, buttransfer of strategic technologies to Korean to do the same.also to pressurise their technology suppliers
Again, however, this set of issues Is Mooeaward.and there is considerable evidence that Ssbvious enoughdifferent conclusions. At a generallevel, it is ©  nteynational
that, as firms in the NICs begin to approach onditions intechnology frontier, they will face onanonal channels.
Seeking to acquire technology through on conditions isHowever, the significance of those changing
NOt so obvious.
beThe ‘price’ of relatively young eoayably thehigher than that of older technology, but hnology are alsoreturns to acquiring and using the newertec n 5 lees?
higher. Is one getting more ‘value for money
Other conditions for acquiring and using tooolderMay well be more restrictive for younger ae may betechnologies. For example, restrictions on expor Moneyee
tighter for technologies that firms in the advancedcount .
“Fe still actively using in their own products.
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that an insurmountable obstacle or a challenge to find new
ways of acquiring relatively young technologies and
exporting products based on them? The experience of the
East Asian NICs (for example in developing OEM and ODM
arrangements with large firms in the advanced countries)'2
suggests that, while the former has been much discussed,
the latter has frequently been the focus for practical action.
It is quite evident that some large Japanesefirms have
recently restricted what had previously been relatively open
access to technology by firms from Korea and Taiwan.However, while again generating a considerable volume of
Korean comment, this has also stimulated Korean firms tofind other sources for the technology they need. Forexample, the Daewoo Corporation has slashed its reliance on
Japanese technology (from 85 per cent of total procurement
in the mid-1980s to 15 per cent) by increasing its relianceon western companies (Business Week 1992).
It is also quite evident that opportunities for suchSwitching of sources for relatively advanced technology mayNarrow with the contracting diversity of potential suppliersthat usually follows the early stages of product/technologylife cycles. However, there are very few segments ofindustry that are so monopolised as to preclude theexploration of alternative sources - although these tend toattract most attention. Also, the process of concentration inadvanced technology industries mayactually increase, ratherthan reduce, effective Opportunities for access to technology- at least during the phase of concentration itself. Forexample, Korean firms obtained key elements for their entryinto semi-conductor production from relatively small US firmsthat, being ‘squeezed’ by competition from the larger firms,were under particularly strong pressure to generate revenuefrom their existing technological assets.
First, i
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acquisition as NIC firms approach the international tonethey do not all seem to be insurmountable or snetraints ahAfter all, despite all the talk about growing Taste the
Korea’s access to technology since the ee ued to riseactual payments made for technology Seee?add 1991.dramatically - nearly doubling between ly likely that asSecond, and more generally, it seems highly + internationalthe age of the technology falls the Opens? pale the termsChannels for acquiring it probably narrows; a rtainly alsoand conditions for acquisition will almost vefleaiié thechange, perhaps becoming more onerous, ae Ber aidgreater commercial value of the technology - Plowewers thethe greater opportunity costs for the supplier.: ‘ imarily on thePrecise outcome in any situation willaeoa tne
interaction between four sets of " traeeltimedh (ii) theCharacteristics of the technologies In oo ‘caw (iit
characteristics of the supplier firms and Cnechnaiouythe technological capabilities of wou af ‘the bargairing
importers, together with other elements al arrangements
Power they can draw on; (iv) the eeaftaohielGaythey use in approaching the acquisition 0
3 : t the
In the absence of any systematic Sea sivemore
‘Slative importance of these, one can © ample, one mightand less emphasis to any of them. For@ those: “axternall
focus on the first two, perhaps a and obstacles.Conditions as invariant constraints, barriers wo - ‘internal’Here, however, we focus on the second t rnment policyConditions over which Brazilian firms and gove
Can exercise some influence.
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3.2.2. THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND BARGAINING
Power OF TECHNOLOGY IMPORTERS
The recent experience of the East Asian NICs confirms
the validity of a much older general principle: access to
technology through international channels depends heavily
on the strength of the importers’ existing technological
capabilities. This relationship seems to operate in a variety
of ways.
First, the ‘depth’ of knowledge and expertise that can
be acquired and absorbed from particular transfer projects
depends on the strength of related knowledge andskill that
are taken into those projects. This is illustrated in the
experience of several ‘heavy’ industry projects in Korea (e.g.
Enos and Park 1988), but it is illustrated by Brazilian
experience as well - for example in the PETROQUISA/
COPESUL case (Sercovich 1980).
Second, the strength of existing mastery of production
technologies, particularly the ability to increase efficiency
and quality, can open access to increasingly advanced
product technology (and sometimes also elements of new
process technology) via OEM, sub-contracting and similar
arrangements.
Third, the strength of existing engineering and design
capabilities may permit effective exploitation of only ‘partial’
access to technology - for example, via reverse engineering
from existing products and equipment, or engineering around
existing patent specifications.
Finally, the importer’s technology-related bargaining
power can havea significant influence on the willingness ofpotential suppliers to enter into transfer agreements in thefirst place. As illustrated by Korean experience in theelectronics industry, this link may be quite ‘visible’ andexplicit’ (for example, in the form of cross
60
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agreements), or it may reflect more ‘implicit’ strategic
Considerations. For example, some Korean firms increased
their own R&D in order to be able to negotiate better for
foreign technology. This is precisely the case of video
Cassette recorder (VCR) technology where, having trouble
licensing technology from Japan, they undertook their own
R&D effort in conjunction with a government laboratory to
develop their own VCR technology just for the Japanese
firms, faced with this credible threat, to agree to license the
technology to Korean firms (Bell and Cassiolato 1993).
A similar relationship between domestic technological
Capability and access to foreign technology seems to have
been involved in the Brazilian electronics industry as the
willingness of foreign companies to transfer eeu
maleey
increased with the growing experience and R&D capability o
Brazilian firms (Cassiolato et al. 1992: 293-94).
Other dimensions of bargaining power cut
across T
technology-related issues - for example, the or an
&xpected growth of markets. But, as not
ed ear ier in
Connection with Japanese experience,
the ef aati
bargaining powerarising from an apparently ‘given ee
Can be highly variable: it can be harnessed as a powe \
Means to stimulate a combination of wider access to
international technology and stronger domestic TSe
ed
technological learning. Alternatively, it can be fragme
and frittered away.
3.2.3. THE InstiTuTIONAL Basis FoR ACQUIRING FOREIGN
TECHNOLOGY
The influence of the combination of technological
©aPability and other elements of bargaining power will vary
with the institutional basis used for technology acquisition.
his Variation may be a matter of intra-firm arrangements -
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Public or quasi-public institutions may act asintermediary importers/licensees in particular areas oftechnology, Providing ‘localised’ knowledge, hardware,training and other Services for domestic firms. The IndustrialTechnology Research Institute in Taiwan seems to haveplayed this type of intermediary role to Support (or initiate)relatively small firms in the electronics industry.
Groups of firms may collaborate (perhaps with theinvolvement of a technological institution) to create astronger organisational and technological basis for searchingOut, Negotiating over, acquiring and absorbing technology ina particular field. This may involve complementary firms - forexample, technology users, engineering firms and equipmentProducers. Alternatively, : it might involve potentialCompetitors that pool their resources and bargaining Powerin the same manner that firms in some of the developedcountries have collaborated in ‘pre-competitive’ R&D.
Firms (or groups of firms) may set up technologyacquiring-cum-developing organisations in the advancedin-
technology for semi-conductor Produearlier, a few Brazilian CompanieComponents industry have followed
Ction. Also, as noted
S in the automobileSimilar Strategies,Singly or collectively, technolo9Y importers may follow
htly different approach in cas€S where the technology
om
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i i in theSought is deeply embedded in part cularfms i. “in
advanced industrial countries. They may scan technology.
of those firms - a strategy widely followe ay gain alco
seeking firms in the developed countries,
used by the Korean electronics industry.
‘ to theWhen the technology elyto beinthearey areainternational frontier, it is also likely tii needing to bebetween (i) being ‘available ' ar erhaps in associationdeveloped. Singly or collectively (an tutions! firms maywith one or more technological ins developing networkstherefore join collaborative Fayoetion These might
and alliances involving firms in other co countries in someConsist of firms in other developing in the advanced in-Situations, or may include mainly firms
dustrial countries in others.
, ies in particular
arise then, firms and een technologycountries soemansetn the acquis ooailties, (ii) wideWith (i) widely varying technologica ‘ning power, and (ii
differences in other elementsof Ibases. Strategies forwidely differing organisational ba weak technologicaltechnology acquisition that rest Orand weakinstitutionalCapabilities, weak bargaining power, he licensing of productbases may well result quite often in t "vent know-how anddesigns and/or the acquisition of equip , algo likely to result
Other inputs for production. But, they ar vero access to then Some combination of {i) limited or cquisition of limitedtechnology in the first place, (ii) ‘the nrough such channels‘depths’ of knowledge and expertise thr ment of relativelyOf access as are opened up, {iii) the  Inited dynamism inhigh costs for what is acquired, and ve acquired.© subsequent assimilation of what w
ies, firmsAt the other end of the spectrum theinternational-d industries that are approaching ed considerable‘chnology frontier will usually at strengths in order‘echnological, bargaining and institutiona
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to acquire foreign technology effectively, or at all. On thataccount alone, the costs of technology transfer may wellrise as the frontier is approached, but those rising costs arenot ‘payments’ for technology (which may well rise also).They are investments in domestic resources for acquiringand assimilating technology; and, until one is at the cuttingedge of the frontier, those costs are likely to remainSubstantially less than the costs of original development ofthe technology. However, that distinction frequently ceasesto have much meaning as one approaches the frontier:technology acquisition and technology development becomeblurred into various combinations of engineering,development and research.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Two basic orientations underlie the conclusions. Thefirst is about how the international competitiveness ofexisting Brazilian industries can be achieved or sustained inthe short-to-medium term. Ina technologically dynamic world
Second, however, even if that Strategy is vjPursued, there are
noe gorouslylimits to which it can sustain
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expanding their natural resource-based industries)wee
adverse effects on trends in international prices. *. tinOther hand, many are eroding Brazil ° ombiningcompetitiveness in labour-intensive industries PY skills andlower wage rates with (access to) technica oie ae
international marketing expertise. In that sonetiveness ofagain two strategies for maintaining the hotBrazilian pricesindustry: (i) managing exchange rates so tat t at the costin international markets remain competitive, i) shifting theOf reducing real domestic incomes; or added productsStructure of industry towards higher value-a the focus
and more technology-intensive industries. Age! '
here is only on the second of those strategies.
These two strategic orientationshave one Faeonarat.
at their core: they will require ‘ennoloaical dynamism.trajectories of significant domestic techno ogi vary between
While the precise meaning of “significant igh In most firmsfirms and industries, one point is clear enoug svestment a
and industries the intensity of eeehange that will be
technological accumulation and technical Cc see will have to
required to create and sustain oOootonly greater than
be very much greater than in the past- ne but also greater
in the immediate past of the ‘lost deca ° in terms of thesethan in the two previous decades which,! vat. were also
aspects of industrial technological development,
largely ‘lost’,
ar j hatThe central issue we have rigin achievingtechnology imports will have to play a mh namism. This,that new intensity of technological ‘the ‘quantity’ ofhowever, is not just a matter of increasing there are more“nPorted technology. Important as thatis, technology is'MPortant ‘qualitative’ issues about how trajectories ofimported in order to incorporate it into the - wolves two
technological dynamism pursuedbyfirms. That |Sets of issues.
65
Instituto bE Economia. UFRJ
First, imported technology will have to be used not just
as the basis for one-off steps which raise competitiveness to
new levels, or which permit merely entry into new product
markets. In a technologically dynamic world, fixed levels of
competitiveness are rapidly eroded, and the basis for entering
markets will rapidly become inadequate for remaining in
them, let alone for expanding within them or diversifying
beyond them. International technology transfer projects can
therefore contribute only to very temporary competitive
positions on trajectories of continuing technological change
and development. Moreover, although further technology
imports can obviously contribute to that subsequent
trajectory, they can do so only partially - and often only veryPartially. Initial imports must therefore be complemented bysubstantial and continuing efforts by the importing firmsthemselves to generate those subsequent trajectories of
technical change.
 
Second, international technology transfer will often also
ti to be used to contribute more ‘indirectly’ to thoReTrajectories - that is, not only by providing inputs to technical
by providing inputs to the accumulation
of
This impties nblesical Capabilities for generating oe
aon at technology transfer arrangements will of at
One. 7ene with two objectives in view, not a
knowled e Ust be Managed (i) in ways that add t
o dor
technical ch expertise and other resources for g
enera m"
efficiently ao aS well as (ii) in ways that contribute i
impleme as Possible to the more imme
diate and dire
Ntation of technical change.
These j rmanagement Ge have implications not onlyont
Policy, However the firm level, but also for govern
Precisely because of the importance .
technological rnnology imports into overall trajectoryConcerne iynem neither management nor a as
distinct ar technology acquisition can be treated :
°88 of isolated action. They must be parts of wide
Norporating
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fields of concern about technology and industrial
Competitiveness in a world where “techno-globalism” is
Nothing more than “global exploitation of technology” by big
international firms and where the accumulation of
technological capabilities is a much more complex issue than
what the “neo-liberal” agenda would like us to believe.
NOTES
' For a recent survey see Freeman (1994) j i2 It is worth Scintine out the existence of important agesa to ans
Yeneral pattern. Also, that there have been some sectors - such as i hand pulp, shoes, steel and petrochemicals - which attained sae!Ee
€xports during the 1980s. However, it is worth recalling tea orfing
these sectors tend to be restricted to commodities aa aney oodsfirms lack technological capabilities to produce higher ee tse Soniand are finding difficulties to penetrate:more sophisticated market seg
at international level.
Following Salter (1966) and others, such
technology were described as ‘vintages and, as : t"
vintage consisted of “a new outfit of capital ae slopmentof
: Alternatively, as outlined later in this section, when the valtechnologycal innovative activity was seen as desirable, cateanalt ee
transfer was seen as having little or nothing to do wit) :
Perhaps as a constraint on the emergence of those ae be much
For example, the intensity of continuopus change seems
Steater in Japanese than US or UK industry, and much gr
6 2” Brazilian or Indian industry. . ;
There are, of course, differences between industri inable over'N the fates of continuous, incremental change that are ne riods
Short term periods. There are also differences in the lengtho t ep aiive
of incremental improvement that occur between more radical ee ie
Steps - for example, successive novel vintages of semiconductor technology









oeessive radical steps in brick-making technolog
é Se kinds of difference, the inter-vintage phases © a
ange are key components of the technological compet!
'Ndustries .
: ‘ n theS has been stated above, the integration of customers |
develo m ment work (von Hippel,im velopmen1976 Pp Ent of new products proves the de lop ‘a witich product
de Is is especi in the software field, MeVelopm S| ially so e ‘
;
u i Oo compli
i rformed for a SPeCITIC
g Stomer, tis s c plicated that
it has to be pe
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® Even when onerefers to relatively indivisible technologies, such as basic
oxygen steelmaking, continuous casting of steel, float glass and barrel
kilns in brickmaking, it is shown that their diffusion process is bothconstrained and dependent upon improvements generated by both
Producers and users of the technology (Ray 1984:87).For example, in the case of waste-water technology and office
automationin Denmark, the lack of local user competence had a negativeeffect upon the systems developed (Lundvall 1989).y For
a
related critique of such Perspectives, sen Wats (C1968
‘ortune (3 June 1991) reviews “How Intellectual Capital Is Becoming
Corporate America’s Most Valuable Asset”. i
Hobday (1993) discusses these arrangements for Original Equipment
Manufacture (OEM) and Original Design and Manufacture (ODM). fere is, of course, a third Strategy: to accelerate Se eaelea e
all uncompetitive industries and firms, hoping that the ‘resources released
(e.g. people unemployed) will somehow be absorbed in other Seeedactivities. Given the Structure of the Brazilian economy, there 's aaaScope for relying much More on this type of British or chen nee
Strategy for industrial competitiveness.
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